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DRUG COURIER PROFILES, AIRPORT STOPS AND THE
INHERENT UNREASONABLENESS OF THE
REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
AFTER UNITED STATES V.
SOKOLOW
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In United States v. Sokolow, I the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that a drug enforcement agent may stop a suspect based on a
standard of reasonable suspicion2 if, considering a totality of the circum-
stances, the agent believes the suspect to be engaged in illegal drug re-
lated activity.' In so holding, the Court sanctioned the use of a "drug
courier profile" as a basis for reasonable suspicion to support a stop.
4
The Court, however, declined to set forth a rule delineating the composi-
tion of a drug courier profile.5 Instead, the Court concluded that an of-
1. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
2. Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than the constitutionally mandated standard
for searches or seizures-that of probable cause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Probable cause,
however, is a somewhat amorphous standard. "Probable cause lies somewhere between bare
suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Philip N. Armentano, The Standards for
Probable Cause under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN. B.J. 137, 144 (1970). For a further
discussion of the probable cause standard, see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
3. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
4. Id. at 10 & n.6. Drug courier profiles are informal compilations of characteristics
thought common to persons transporting narcotics. Joseph P. D'Ambrosio, Note, The Drug
Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 NovA
L. REv. 273, 275 (1987). The use of profiles was first instituted in Detroit by the FAA in 1968
to discourage hijacking attempts. See Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers:
The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REv. 843,
847 (1985). The use of profiles in the drug courier context was developed by Paul Markonni, a
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, for use in the Detroit Airport to combat
drug smuggling, and was first implemented in 1974. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413,
1425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (Wiggins, J., dissenting), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). The original drug
courier profile developed by Agent Markonni consisted of seven primary characteristics:
(1) arrival or departure from source city; (2) little or no luggage; (3) unusual itinerary; (4) use
of an alias; (5) carrying large amounts of cash; (6) buying ticket with cash in small denomina-
tions; (7) unusually nervous. Four secondary characteristics were also defined: (1) exclusive
use of public transportation; (2) making call after deplaning; (3) leaving false call-back number
with airline; (4) excessive travel to and from source cities. Id.
Typically, when an agent observes a passenger displaying one or more of the profile
characteristics, he or she follows the suspect through the airport concourse and decides
whether to make a stop. D'Ambrosio, supra, at 276. At this point, if the agent decides to
make a stop, he or she will approach the suspect and identify himself or herself as a law
enforcement officer and proceed with a preliminary investigation. Id.
5. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10. Rather, the Court validated the use of profiles in the most
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ficer has sufficient cause to stop a suspect if, based on a totality of the
circumstances, the traditional bases for a stop founded on reasonable sus-
picion are met. By endorsing a reasonable suspicion stop based on a
drug courier proffle, but neglecting to define standards or limitations for
these profiles, the Court allows a reasonable suspicion stop to be predi-
cated upon an officer's subjective interpretation of what characteristics a
drug courier should display,7 regardless of whether these characteristics
are indicia of ongoing criminal activity,8 or whether the characteristics
could be classified as innocent behavior. 9 The rules, or lack thereof, de-
rived from Sokolow contradict the limits of reasonable suspicion stops
based on objective reasonableness that the Court has previously de-
fined, 10 and in effect sanction stops based on nothing more than hunches
and subjective stereotypes.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Sokolow in the context of the Court's prior analyses of Fourth Amend-
ment detention issues. This Note then addresses the implications of
Sokolow in light of subsequent decisions by the Court.
This Note concludes that the Court, in validating a reasonable suspi-
cion stop based on a determination that can be derived from subjective
factors, seriously impinges upon the Fourth Amendment rights of those
stopped pursuant to drug courier profiles who display innocent behavior.
Of equal significance is the potential for violation of the rights of inno-
cent travelers in the nation's airports who could become subjected to
overbearing and harassing police conduct, the consequences of which
could be drastic in light of subsequent decisions by the Court.'1 Finally,
this Note proposes that an analysis by investigating officers that is consis-
tent with previous formulations of the reasonable suspicion standard
should be adopted, and recommends the elimination of drug courier
profiles. Instead, articulable facts indicating criminal activity based on
general of terms, stipulating that "the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does
not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance." Id.
6. Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
7. See infra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
8. This factor has been required by the Court to uphold such stops since the Court set
forth the standard for reasonable suspicion stops in Terry, 392 U.S. 1. See infra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
9. Indeed, under Sokolow, acts which in isolation are considered consistent with innocent
travel may nonetheless, when considered together, establish cause for further investigation.
United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)).
10. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
[VCol. 25:321
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objective reasonableness must be established before a suspect may be
stopped if believed by the officers to be engaged in crime.
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
1. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees the right of all citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures,12 and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause."' 3 Thus, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unrea-
sonable governmental intrusions.14 An intrusion is deemed subject to
Fourth Amendment protection if it involves an intrusion in an area
where a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 A privacy in-
terest will be deemed reasonable if a person has: (1) an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as objectively reasonable. 6
An intrusion will be deemed per se reasonable, and a warrant to
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."
Id. There is an exclusionary remedy for violations of a defendant's constitutional rights, first
espoused by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1924) and
applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The exclusionary rule prohib-
its the use of evidence or testimony obtained by government officials through means violative
of the Constitution. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
484-88 (1963). Thus, all evidence obtained in a manner in which governmental agents have
less than the constitutionally mandated degree of suspicion necessary to proceed will be
deemed invalid and cannot be used as evidence against a defendant at trial if it can be estab-
lished that the evidence was obtained in a manner which amounts to a constitutional violation.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. In addition, evidence subsequently derived from evidence defectively
obtained will be deemed invalid under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Wong Sun, 371
U.S. at 484. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, an unconstitutional search or
seizure "taints" all evidence that stems therefrom and renders the evidence inadmissible. Id.
Further, all evidence subsequently derived from the tainted evidence will also be inadmissible
unless the connection to the tainted evidence is so attenuated as to "purge the taint." Id. at
487-88.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
14. A governmental intrusion is deemed to be unreasonable unless the intrusion has been
sanctioned by the issuance of a warrant by a detached and disinterested magistrate, based upon
a showing of probable cause, or an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See, e.g.,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].'" Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)). See generally 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 515-27 (1987).
15. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
16. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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search may be issued, if there is a showing of probable cause.17 Probable
cause to search may be found to exist when the facts and circumstances
would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that seizable objects
are located in the place to be searched.
18
In certain instances, particularly under exigent circumstances, a
warrant may not be necessary and thus some searches may take place
without a warrant provided that they are supported by probable cause.' 9
In certain situations, however, the Court has employed a "balancing
test"2 and has allowed searches and seizures on a showing of less than
probable cause, such as reasonable suspicion. The first case that sanc-
tioned this approach, was Terry v. Ohio.2'
2. Terry v. Ohio and the foundations of the reasonable suspicion
standard
In Terry v. Ohio,22 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether it is always unreasonable for a police officer to seize a
person and subject him to a limited search for weapons upon less than
probable cause for an arrest.23 The Court held that the stop of a suspect
for a brief detention could be constitutionally permissible in certain situa-
tions despite a lack of probable cause for a full arrest or search.24 The
Court, however, acknowledged a balancing of interests to justify this in-
trusion.2  The Court concluded that a stop-a seizure tantamount to a
17. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
18. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. Prior to 1967, Supreme Court cases appeared to forbid
search warrants for items other than fruits or instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.
CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 155 (1986).
However, in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court held that warrants could be
issued for evidence which did not fit into one of the three aforementioned categories, provided
there was a "nexus" between the evidence and the criminal behavior. Id. at 310.
19. An in-depth examination of exigent circumstances and other situations justifying
searches without warrants exceeds the scope of this Note. The traditional exceptions to the
warrant requirement are: hot pursuit of a criminal suspect; destruction of evidence imminent;
emergencies; automobiles; searches of items in plain view when an officer is already at a lawful
vantage point; search incident to a lawful arrest; administrative inspections; inventory searches
pursuant to an arrest; and consentual searches. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 18, at
144-293.
20. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). Under a balancing test
approach, the court will balance the governmental interest served against the relative intrusive-
ness to the individual. Id. at 534-37; see also infra notes 266-75 and accompanying text.
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 30-31.
25. Id. at 21. The Court provided that as a general proposition:
[I]t is necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies
official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,
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brief detention 26-- could be based on reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause, because a brief detention is less intrusive than a seizure
invoking Fourth Amendment protection and thus requiring probable
cause.
27
The circumstances in Terry involved two men who were "casing" a
jewelry store.28 The officer who observed the men testified that in light of
his thirty-five years of experience, he believed the men were about to
engage in a "stick-up," 29 and that he feared that "they may have a
gun."" 0 The officer approached the men, identified himself as a police
officer and asked for their names.3" One of the men mumbled something,
and then the officer grabbed Terry, spun him around and patted down
the outside of his clothing.32 The officer found. a pistol in Terry's coat
pocket, 3 and then removed Terry's coat and found a revolver in Terry's
possession, as well as weapons possessed by the other man.3 4 The weap-
ons were seized and the men were charged with carrying concealed weap-
ons." The officer testified at trial that he never placed his hands beneath
Terry's garments. 36 The Court rationalized such a stop based on the
need to deal quickly with dangers of impending criminal activity in rela-
for there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.
Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)). The Court also
acknowledged that "[t]he scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified' by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
26. Id. at 16. "[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id.
27. Id. at 26. The threshold question under Terry is whether a brief detention is actually
an arrest (a prolonged detention), in which case Fourth Amendment protection would be in-
voked, and probable cause to stop would be necessary. Factors which can be analyzed to
determine whether a confrontation is a stop or a brief detention include: (1) the duration of
the stop; (2) whether the police actions were threatening; (3) whether the person detained was
touched by the police; (4) whether the detention took place in a closed area or open to public
view; and (5) whether from an objective standpoint the person detained would have reasonably
felt that he was free to leave. WHrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 18, at 229. But see infra
notes 287-90 and accompanying text (analyzing recent Supreme Court cases which considera-
bly limit scope of what can be classified a stop, and broaden purview of "voluntary
encounters").
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6-7.
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tion to the relatively minor intrusion of a brief detention. 7
The Court, however, sanctioned a stop to allow an officer to search
for weapons 3 1 in the interest of the officer's safety ;39 such stops to search
for evidence of crime were strictly proscribed.' °  In subsequent cases, the
Court has reinforced that an officer may not stop and frisk a suspect
under Terry to search for evidence without probable cause. 41 The Court
has emphasized that justification for a "Terry stop" must be based on an
objective standard,42 and there must be articulable facts that lead the of-
ficer to reasonably conclude that the suspect with whom he or she is
dealing is armed and presently dangerous. 3
The aspects of Terry most relevant in the drug courier context are
the Court's articulation of the requirements for application of the reason-
able suspicion standard and the guidelines for application of that
standard.
The Supreme Court has stated that in determining the applicability
of a standard of less than probable cause, it is necessary to first "focus
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
37. Id. at 26-27. "Distinctions should be made between a 'stop' and 'arrest,' (or 'seizure'
of a person), and between a 'frisk' and a 'search.'" Id. at 10. Thus, it was argued, the police
should be permitted to "stop" a person and detain him or her briefly for questioning based
upon the suspicion that he or she may be connected with criminal activity. Id. at 24. Upon
suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should have the authority to "frisk" him or
her for weapons. Id. If the "stop" and the "frisk" give rise to probable cause to believe that
the suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make a formal
"arrest," and a full incident "search" of that person. Id. at 26-27. This scheme is justified in
part upon the notion that a "stop" and a "frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and
petty indignity," id. at 10, which can properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of
effective law enforcement on the basis of a police officer's suspicion. Id. at 10-11.
38. Id. at 24-25.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id. at 29. The Court provided that "[tihe sole justification of the search ... [was] the
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to
an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other hidden instruments
for the assault of the police officer." Id. "[S]uch a search, unlike a search without a warrant
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruc-
tion of evidence of crime." Id.; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-65 (1968)
(seizure of contraband unconstitutional under Terry standard when officer did not have ade-
quate justification to search for weapons).
41. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65 (search of suspected narcotics dealer "unreasonable" be-
cause not motivated by officer's concern for his safety-the sole justification for frisk in Terry);
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
43. Id. at 29-30. For example, the officer must observe the suspect "engage in unusual
conduct leading to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred, is occurring, or
is about to occur and can point to specific and articulable facts to warrant the suspicion."
WHrrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 18, at 229.
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upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen."'
Furthermore, "in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."4 In making such an assessment, an objective standard must
be applied." The proper inquiry being, "would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search, warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?"'47
The Court acknowledged the importance of providing specific justifica-
tions for the stop in order for the reasonable suspicion standard to be
consistent with Fourth Amendment protections.48 Finally, the Court
recognized the risks inherent in allowing application of the reasonable
suspicion standard and acknowledged the need to provide a judicial
check on police conduct.4 9
3. Post-Terry applications of the reasonable suspicion standard
In light of Terry, and in the wake of a more conservative Supreme
Court, the reasonable suspicion standard has been extended and re-
laxed.5 0 The Court has construed Terry to mean that "the validity of any
seizure short of an arrest and any accompanying frisk is governed by the
Fourth Amendment's amorphous 'reasonableness' standard rather than
the precise guidelines set out in Terry."51 Thus, the determinative ques-
tion in cases that follow Terry is whether a stop can be justified as reason-
able within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 ("[T]here is no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.").
45. Id.; see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (search and seizure incident to arrest
invalid when probable cause for arrest does not exist); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
(evidence seized incident to lawful arrest, supported by probable cause, admissible).
46. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
47. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
48. Id. at 11 ("The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe re-
quirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled
with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the
commands of the Constitution.").
49. Id. at 15.
Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against
police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal
security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution re-
quires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.
Id.
50. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
51. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 18, at 204.
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Following Terry the Court has attempted to apply this "reasonable-
ness" standard. The first case that applied a "softened" approach to the
reasonable suspicion standard was Adams v. Williams.52 Williams is sig-
nificant because it broadened the permissible basis for a Terry stop. The
Court concluded that it was permissible to justify a reasonable suspicion
stop based not just on the officer's own observations,13 but on an inform-
ant's tip.54 In Williams, however, the justification for the stop was pre-
mised on a need to protect the safety of the officer, not to search for
contraband.55 Thus, the Williams decision did not clarify what degree of
criminality is necessary to invoke Terry, and to which stops the reason-
able suspicion standard will apply.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,56 application of the reasonable
suspicion standard was reexamined. The case involved enforcement of
immigration laws by roving patrol cars near the United States and Mex-
ico border.5 7 In overturning Brignoni-Ponce's conviction, the Court re-
affirmed that all encounters between police and people whom they may
52. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Williams involved a police officer who received information from
an informant that the defendant Williams, who was seated in a nearby car, was carrying drugs
and had a gun concealed in his car. Id. at 144-45. The officer approached and asked Williams
to open the door of the car. Id. at 145. When Williams rolled down the car window, the
officer reached in and removed a revolver from Williams' waistband, although it was not visi-
ble from outside the car. Id. The officer then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a
revolver and for possession of heroin. Id. The heroin was produced by a subsequent search
incident to that arrest. Id. The Court found that the information from the informant was
sufficient to justify the stop of the car and the subsequent search that produced the contraband
was valid. Id. at 146-47.
53. Id. at 147.
54. Id. Further, the Court held that the informant's tip may provide reasonable suspicion
for a stop and frisk even if the officer perceives no unusual conduct on the part of the suspect,
and even if the tip is not sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to support the issuance
of a warrant. Id. at 147-49.
55. Id. at 147-48.
56. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
57. Id. at 875. Brignoni-Ponce's car was stopped by a roving patrol car. Id. The two
officers later admitted that their only reason for stopping the car was that the three occupants
appeared to be of Mexican descent. Id. After questioning, it was revealed that his two passen-
gers had entered the country illegally. Id. All three occupants of the car were arrested and
Brignoni-Ponce was subsequently convicted for transporting illegal aliens. Id. The govern-
ment argued that it should be permissible to stop any person near the border for limited ques-
tioning about their immigration status. Id. at 876-77. The Supreme Court, however, in a
unanimous decision, concluded "[w]e are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely
with the requirement that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving-patrol
stops." Id. at 882. The Court reasoned that except at a fixed checkpoint on the border, where
security of the country could justify a stop based on less than reasonable suspicion, border
patrol officers are prohibited from stopping vehicles unless they know of specific articulable
facts that a particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. Id. at 884; see United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975) (vehicle stop at fixed checkpoint 66 miles north of border not supported by
probable cause and thus invalid); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
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suspect to be engaged in criminal activity must be grounded on at least
reasonable suspicion.5 8 The Court emphasized that the sole justification
for the stop was that Brignoni-Ponce and his companions appeared to be
of Mexican origin. 9 The Court reasoned that this factor alone could not
justify a stop.'
The Court applied a similar line of reasoning in Brown v. Texas.61
In analyzing the situation presented in Brown, the Court stated that the
reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment of seizures that are
less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on a balance between the
public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.6 2 Applying this balancing test ap-
proach, the Court concluded that reasonable suspicion did not exist on
these facts to justify the stop, reasoning that the stop was unjustified be-
cause there was no claim of any specific misconduct on Brown's part, nor
did the officers believe that he was armed. 3 The Court held that a stop
must be based on reasonable suspicion that the person stopped "was en-
gaged [in] or had engaged in criminal conduct."'  Vague suspicion is not
enough. Officers must have reasonable suspicion based on objective
facts.
65
(stops by roving border patrols near United States and Mexico border and accompanying vehi-
cle search impermissible unless there is reasonable suspicion to support stop).
58. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
59. Id. at 885-86.
60. "The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough
to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping
all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens." Id.
61. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). In Brown, two police officers observed the defendant and another
man walking away from one another in an alley. Id. at 48. The officers testified that they
believed that their presence either broke up or prevented a meeting between the two men. Id.
One officer got out of the car and asked Brown to identify himself and explain what he was
doing in the alley. Id. Brown refused and asserted that the officer had no right to detain him.
Id. at 49. The officer replied that Brown was in an area with a high drug problem. Id. The
officer then frisked him, but found nothing. Id. (A frisk authorized under Terry is a limited
type of search whereby a suspect is briefly detained and the outer surfaces of the suspect's
clothing are patted down to search for weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-31.). Brown was ar-
rested and later convicted under a Texas statute that makes it a crime for a person to refuse to
give his name and address to an officer who lawfully stopped him to request information.
Brown, 443 U.S. at 49.
62. Id. at 50-51 ("Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weigh-
ing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.").
63. Id. "There is no indication in the record that it was unusual for people to be in the
alley. The fact that the appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing
alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct."
Id. at 52.
64. Id. at 53.
65. Id. at 51-52.
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Application of the reasonable suspicion standard was again reviewed
in Dunaway v. New York. 66 Dunaway demonstrates the Court's unwill-
ingness to apply the reasonable suspicion standard in all instances. In
Dunaway, the Court recognized that the Terry Court had departed from
the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis by "defin[ing] a special cate-
gory of Fourth Amendment 'seizures' so substantially less intrusive than
arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth
Amendment 'seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balancing
test."' 67 Thus, the majority in Dunaway found Terry inapplicable68 be-
cause a stop and frisk implicates only a "limited violation of individual
privacy, ' ' 69 while advancing substantial "interests in [both] crime preven-
tion and detection and in the police officer's safety,"7 0 yet the seizure in
Dunaway protected none of these concerns. Dunaway emphasized that
not all seizures can be justified by reasonable suspicion: "For all but...
narrowly defined intrusions, seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported
by probable cause."'"
4. Sliding scale approach
Despite limitations on its application, the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard has been expanded to apply to situations outside the scope of a
Terry stop. In a number of situations, the stop of a suspect based on less
than probable cause or even with no degree of suspicion whatsoever may
be justified when weighed against a competing interest that is more com-
pelling.72 Such compelling interests include: (1) protecting police of-
ficers from suspects whom they stop on the road;73 (2) protecting society
66. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, the defendant was taken into custody in the course
of the investigation of an attempted robbery and murder. Id. at 203. The police did not have
probable cause to detain Dunaway. Id. at 206-07. Yet, Dunaway was convicted based on
information obtained during this detention. Id. at 203. The Supreme Court reversed, indicat-
ing that a detention for custodial investigation requires probable cause. Id. at 216.
67. Id. at 210 ("[A]pplication of this balancing test led the [Terry] Court to approve this
narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only
for the purpose of a pat-down for weapons.").
68. Id. at 212-13.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 211-14.
72. To determine the reasonableness of the intrusion, it is necessary to balance the public
interest served by the seizure against the nature and scope of the intrusion in relation to the
objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and
expertise. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
73. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The police may order a suspect out
of a car when stopped for even routine traffic violations. Id. at 109-11. This may be done even
if the officer has no reasonable suspicion that the driver poses a threat to the officer's safety.
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from the threat of people driving stolen cars;74 and (3) protecting society
against railway workers or federal customs employees from using drugs
in the workplace.
75
This "sliding scale" approach is premised on a balancing test the-
ory,7 6 that requires a "focus upon the governmental interest which alleg-
edly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen."7 7 Hence, in certain instances if there is a
compelling government interest that outweighs the relative intrusiveness
to a citizen, governmental intrusions may be justified on less than prob-
able cause outside the realm of a Teny stop situation. Under the balanc-
ing test approach, however, it is necessary to analyze not just the relative
gravity of the intrusion against a defendant, 78 but also against the right
of all citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.7 9 It is
with these competing interests in mind that the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in the drug courier area must be examined.
Id. The Court justified this on the de minimus nature of the intrusion when weighed against
protecting officers from being assaulted. Id. at 111.
74. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118-19 (1986) (once officer has suspect out of
car, permissible for officer to reach in and remove objects obscuring dashboard to expose vehi-
cle identification number).
75. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989)
(mandatory drug testing permissible, without prior suspicion, in railway industry in interest of
prevention of train accidents); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 679 (1989) (permitting suspicionless, mandatory urine testing of United States Customs
Service Employees applying for promotion to positions requiring handling firearms or classi-
fied materials).
76. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. "[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
77. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. "There is no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails." Id. at 536-37.
78. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) ("The reasonableness of seizures that are
less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on a balance between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." (cita-
tions omitted)).
79. See U.S. CONsr. amend. IV. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law." Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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B. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Application of the Reasonable
Suspicion Standard in Drug Courier Cases Prior to United
States v. Sokolow
1. United States v. Mendenhall
United States v. Mendenhall 80 was the first Supreme Court case to
analyze the drug courier profile81 in the context of the reasonable suspi-
cion standard. In Mendenhall, a twenty-two year old black woman was
confronted in the Detroit airport by two plain clothes Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents because her conduct appeared to the
agents to be "characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics."82
The agents identified themselves and asked Mendenhall for her ticket
and identification.83 The agents inquired as to why Mendenhall's ticket
was not in her name."4 When Mendenhall became shaken and nervous,
the DEA agents asked her to accompany them to a private room at the
airport85 and she complied. 6
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, in a plurality opinion, believed that
this confrontation was not a seizure.87 Rather, it was deemed a volun-
tary encounter and therefore the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspi-
cion analysis was not invoked.88 The Court, however, did offer an
analysis for determining when a stop constitutes a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.89 The Court's test proposed that a
seizure invoking Fourth Amendment protection has occurred only when
"a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to
leave."
90
The Court in Mendenhall concluded that there had been no unlaw-
ful seizure because of the defendant's voluntary compliance. 91 The dis-
80. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
82. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547. The agents testified that Mendenhall's behavior fit a
"drug-courier profile." Id. at 548 n.1.
83. Id. at 547-48 & n.l.
84. Id. at 548.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 548-49.
87. Id. at 555.
88. Id. at 554-55.
89. Id. at 553-54.
90. Id. at 554. The Court gave some examples of circumstances which might indicate a
seizure: "[The threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id. Thus, the
Court in Mendenhall was far from clear on the issue of exactly what may be deemed to consti-
tute a seizure in the context of an encounter with a suspected drug courier at an airport.
91. Id. at 557-58.
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sent noted, however, that her behavior was "the kind of behavior that
could reasonably be expected of anyone changing planes in an airport
terminal,"92 and labeled the officers' suspicions based on profile factors a
"hunch" rather than suspicion based on "specific reasonable
inferences. 93
2. Reid v. Georgia
In Reid v. Georgia,94 the defendant arrived in Atlanta on a commer-
cial flight originating in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.95 The passengers left
the plane in a single fie and proceeded through the concourse.96 Reid
was observed by a DEA agent who was in the airport to uncover drug
smuggling operations.97 Separated from Reid by several persons was an-
other man who carried a shoulder bag similar to Reid's.98 As the passen-
gers proceeded through the concourse past the baggage claim area, Reid
occasionally glanced in the direction of the other man. 99 When the two
men reached the main lobby of the terminal, the second man caught up
with Reid and they spoke briefly. 11 The two men then left the terminal
together.101
A DEA agent approached Reid and his companion outside of the
building, identified himself as a DEA agent, and asked them to display
their identification and ticket stubs. 1°2 Both men complied. 3 The tick-
ets, which had been purchased with Reid's credit card, revealed that both
men had been staying in Fort Lauderdale only one day."° According to
the agent's testimony, the men appeared nervous during this encoun-
ter. 05 The agent then asked the men if they would agree to return to the
terminal and to consent to a search of their persons and their shoulder
bags.' °6 The agent testified that Reid nodded his head affirmatively, and
that the other responded "yeah, okay."' 0 7 As the three men reentered
92. Id. at 572 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 573 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
94. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
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the terminal, however, Reid began to run. Before he was apprehended,
he abandoned his shoulder bag. 108 The bag, when recovered, was found
to contain cocaine." Reid was subsequently charged with possession of
cocaine. 110
The Court in Reid held that as a matter of law these facts did not
give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity,"'1
and therefore did not justify a Terry stop.112 Specifically, the Court
found that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity does not exist when a
person: gets off of a plane from Fort Lauderdale at a time in the morning
when law enforcement activity is minimal; has no luggage other than a
shoulder bag; apparently makes efforts to conceal that he is traveling
with someone else; and occasionally looks back at that person.1 13
"[These] circumstances describe a very large category of presumably in-
nocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were
the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case
could justify a seizure."114
3. Florida v. Royer
In Florida v. Royer,11 5 the Court again addressed the reasonable sus-
picion standard in the drug courier context, and also addressed the re-
lated issue of whether a seizure had actually occurred when agents
encountered the suspect. Royer was observed at Miami International
Airport by two plainclothes detectives. 6 The detectives believed that
Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage and actions fit the "drug cou-
rier proffle." 7 As Royer made his way through the airport, the two
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 441.
111. Id.
112. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that the Georgia Court of Appeals had upheld
the stop precisely because Reid, "in a number of respects, fit a 'profile' of drug couriers com-
piled by the [Drug Enforcement Administration]." Id. at 440-41.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court reasoned that the relevant evidence in this case was more an "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch" and was "simply too slender a reed to support the
seizure in this case." Id.
115. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
116. Id. at 493.
117. The Court in Royer indicated:
[T]he "drug courier profile" is an abstract of characteristics found to be typical of
persons transporting illegal drugs. In Royer's case, the detectives [sic] attention was
attracted by the following facts which were considered to be within the profile: (a)
Royer was carrying American Tourister luggage, which appeared to be heavy, (b) he
was young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casually dressed, (d) he appeared
pale and nervous, looking around at other people, (e) he paid for his ticket in cash
[Vol. 25:321
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detectives approached him, and asked if he had a moment to speak with
them."1 8 Royer replied "yes," and upon request produced for the detec-
tives his airline ticket and his driver's license.' 19 Royer's ticket bore a
different name than his baggage identification tags. 2 ' When the detec-
tives inquired about this discrepancy, Royer became nervous.' 2 1 The two
detectives did not return his airline ticket and identification, but asked
Royer to accompany them to a room, approximately forty feet away. 122
Royer said nothing in response, but went with the officers as he had been
asked to do. 123 Royer was then asked if he would consent to a search of
his luggage.' 24 Without providing a verbal response, Royer produced a
key to one of the suitcases and unlocked it.125 Drugs were found in the
suitcase. 126 Royer stated that he did not know the combination to his
second suitcase, but gave the officers permission to break it open.' 27
When they did, the officers found marijuana inside.128 Royer was then
arrested and charged with possession of marijuana.'
29
Prior to trial, Royer made a motion to suppress the evidence. The
trial court denied the motion because it found that Royer's consent to the
search was "freely and voluntarily given."' 30 The Florida District Court
of Appeal reversed Royer's conviction,' 3 ' holding that Royer had been
involuntarily confined without probable cause, 3 2 and that the involun-
tary detention had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry.1
3 3
The Supreme Court affirmed,"' holding that the police conduct
constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 3 5 The Court con-
with a large number of bills, and (f) rather than completing the airline identification
tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had space for a name, address, and
telephone number, he wrote only a name and the destination.
Id. at 493 n.2.
















134. Id. at 507-08.
135. Id. at 501.
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cluded that this "stop," which may have been valid under Terry's reason-
able suspicion standard, was transformed into an illegal arrest 3 6 as the
detention continued and Royer was moved into the room at the air-
port. 137 The Court considered this stop to be "more intrusive than
necessary."
' 13 8
Although a majority of the Court in Royer concluded that the police
actions were unduly intrusive, Royer may represent a broadening of the
Terry stop analysis; the Court seemed willing to allow the police to stop
and question the defendant to investigate criminal activity, but not
merely as a protective measure.
139
4. Florida v. Rodriguez
In Florida v. Rodriguez,14 the Court had yet another opportunity to
apply the reasonable suspicion standard to a temporary detention of a
person for questioning at an airport. Rodriguez did not involve the use
of drug courier profiles per se, and so will not be discussed at length in
this Note. However, the Court in Rodriguez did conclude that a stop
was justified based on reasonable suspicion when, in the concourse of a
major international airport: (1) the accused and two companions were
observed by two plainclothes narcotics officers to speak furtively with
one another after each had spotted the officers; (2) one of the companions
was heard urging the others to "get out of here"; (3) the accused at-
tempted to run away, but despite pumping his legs up and down very fast
was unable to get very far; (4) after handing one of the officers an airline
ticket with three names on it, the accused and one of his companions
both claimed to have one of the three names; (5) the officers asked for
consent to search the accused's luggage, and the accused, after first deny-
ing that he had the key, produced the key; and (6) one officer opened the
accused's suitcase and found cocaine inside. 141
136. Id. at 502. The stop was illegal in the sense that it was not supported by the constitu-
tionally mandated degree of suspicion necessary to justify an arrest-probable cause. Id.; see
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501.
138. Id. at 504.
139. Id. at 500.
140. 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
141. Id. at 3-4. The Court supported its holding in Rodriguez by positing that the public
interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or other serious crimes
negated the need for probable cause for such a detention and thus justified application of the
less stringent standard of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 5.
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II. UNITED STATES V SOKOLOW
A. Statement of the Case and Background of the Supreme Court
Decision
Andrew Sokolow, a traveler arriving at Honolulu International Air-
port, was approached by DEA agents while hailing a cab,142 after the
agents noticed that Sokolow's behavior "had all the classic aspects of a
drug courier." '143 On the basis of this information, one agent displayed
his credentials, grabbed Sokolow's arm, and moved him back to the side-
walk, asking for his ticket and identification.'" Sokolow told the agent
that he had neither, that his name was "Sokolow," but that he was trav-
eling under his mother's maiden name.
145
Sokolow and his companion were taken to the DEA office at the
airport where the couple's luggage was sniffed by a narcotics-detecting
dog,14' which alerted the agents to Sokolow's brown Louis Vuitton
shoulder bag. 47 The agents arrested Sokolow and advised him of his
constitutional rights. 48  The agents then obtained a warrant to search
the bag and found that it contained no drugs, but did contain some suspi-
cious documents that referenced Sokolow's involvement in drug-related
activities. 4 9 Because it .was late in the evening, the agents could not ob-
tain a second warrant for the remaining luggage. 50 The agents allofed
Sokolow to leave for the night but kept his luggage.' The next morn-
ing, after a second dog confirmed the first dog's alert, the agents obtained
142. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
143. Id. at 10 n.6. The agents noticed that: (1) he paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets from
a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did riot match the name under which his
telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for drugs;
(4) he stayed only 48 hours, even though a round trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20
hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. Id. at
3.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id.
146. Id. The use of drug-detecting dogs to sniff luggage has been sanctioned by the Court,
and has been found not to constitute a search because the intrusion is thought to be negligible.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). "As to the examination of inanimate objects,
the general rule is that a canine sniff is not a search. The Fourth Amendment therefore does
not limit such investigations. However, if the object must first be removed from the possession
of its owner, that removal is a seizure and the seizre-not the sniff-must be based on reason-
able suspicion." Jeffrey T. Even, The Fourth Amendment and Drug-Detecting Dogs, 48 MONT.
L. REV. 101, 117-18 (1987).
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Sokolow was indicted for possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute. 15 3 The United States District Court for Hawaii denied Soko-
low's motion to suppress the seized cocaine, 5 4 finding that the DEA
agents had a reasonable suspicion that Sokolow was involved in drug
trafficking when they stopped him at the airport."' Sokolow then en-
tered a conditional guilty plea to the offense charged. 5 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
Sokolow's conviction,' 57 holding that the DEA agents did not have rea-
sonable suspicion to justify the stop. 58 In so doing, the court set forth a
two-step framework for analyzing stops made pursuant to a drug courier
profile. First, a threshold determination must be made as to whether
there were sufficient facts indicating ongoing criminal activity to justify
the stop, such as the use of an alias, or evasive movement through the
airport.' 59 The court indicated that one such factor is always needed to
support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 6°
The second step in the analysis is an examination of the facts
describing personal characteristics of drug couriers, for example, pay-
ment for tickets with cash or short trips to a source city.1 61 Such facts
only become relevant if there are facts falling into the first category as
well, such that there is a basis for reasonable suspicion.1 62 Facts of the
second type are not relevant in and of themselves because they describe
the behavior of "significant numbers of innocent persons."
' 163
In applying this two-part analysis in Sokolow's case, the court found
that there was no evidence of ongoing criminal activity and thus the
agents' stop was impermissible.' 6  The dissent, however, argued that the




155. Id. at 5-6.
156. Id. at 6.
157. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
This decision was issued after the government petitioned for rehearing of an earlier decision
(United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987)) on the grounds that "the court had
erred in considering each of the facts known to the agents separately rather than in terms of
the totality of the circumstances." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 6 n.2.
158. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1419.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1420.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1422.
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reasonable articulable suspicion based on all the facts."16
B. The Supreme Court Decision
After several years of avoiding the drug courier profile issue, the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Sokolow 16 6 attempted to
address when and how characteristics found in drug courier profiles can
be utilized in airport stops. In reversing the Ninth Circuit,167 the Court
found critical whether the agents had sufficient reasonable suspicion,
based on a totality of the circumstances, to stop Sokolow when they ini-
tially encountered him at the airport.1 68 The Court criticized the ap-
proach taken by the Ninth Circuit, indicating that the two-part test
"create[s] unnecessary difficult[ies] in dealing with one of the relatively
simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment." 169 The Court,
however, failed to articulate what can constitutionally comprise a drug
courier profile in the airport stop context, leaving lower courts the bur-
den of interpreting drug courier issues on a case-by-case basis.170
1. Majority opinion
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit 171 which attempted to implement a rule requiring ob-
jective indicia of ongoing criminal activity before reasonable suspicion
could be found. 72 The Court reasoned that the concept of reasonable
suspicion "is not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.' ",173 Instead, the Court implemented a totality of the circum-
stances approach to determinations of reasonable suspicion. 74 In so
165. Id. at 1426 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
166. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 7-8.
170. As Justice Marshall notes in his dissent in Sokolow, "the majority thus ducks serious
issues relating to a questionable law enforcement practice, to address the validity of which we
granted certiorari in this case." Id. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 7.
172. See United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
See supra notes 142-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit analysis.
173. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
174. Id. at 7-8. The Court adopted the reasoning of United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411
(1981), as rationalization for a totality of the circumstances approach. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8.
Under a totality of the circumstances approach, the "whole picture" is taken into account to
determine whether there is sufficient factual justification to stop a suspect. Cortez, 449 U.S. at
417. Thus, "[biased upon the whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. at
417-18. The Court in Cortez set forth two elements that must be present before a stop is
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doing, the Court acknowledged that factors which ordinarily are indica-
tive of innocent behavior can, when taken in totality, be the basis for
reasonable suspicion to support a stop.1 75
The Court acknowledged that the characteristics that supported the
stop in Sokolow's case were components of a drug courier profile, yet this
did not detract from their evidentiary significance. 176 The majority did
not, however, set forth what characteristics could constitutionally com-
prise a drug courier proffle used to support a reasonable suspicion stop
beyond the situation presented in Sokolow itself. Rather, the Court
stated that "[a] court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable sus-
picion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to th[e]
conclusion [to stop a suspect]."
' 17 7
Finally, the majority disagreed with Sokolow's contention that the
DEA agents were obligated to use the least intrusive means to verify or




Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, dissented from
the majority opinion on the grounds that in upholding Sokolow's convic-
tion, the court seriously impinged upon the Fourth Amendment rights of
all persons who utilize the nation's airports. 179 The dissent noted that
reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, is required
in order to support an airport stop to "deter egregious police behav-
ior,"1' ° and that the facts set forth in Sokolow do not support a stop
permissible under a totality of the circumstances approach: (1) "the assessment must be based
upon all of the circumstances"; and (2) the assessment "must raise a suspicion that the particu-
lar individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." Id. at 418. The Court in Cortez, in
reference to the second prong of the analysis, quoted Chief Justice Warren in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968): "This demand for specificity in the information upon which police
action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (emphasis in original). However, in adopting this approach, the Court
in Cortez acknowledged that the process of assessing the validity of a stop "does not deal with
hard certainties, but with probabilities." Id. Thus, law enforcement officers, like jurors, are
permitted to "formulate[ ] certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior" to serve
as a basis for stopping a suspect. Id.
175. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9.
176. Id. at 10.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 11 ("The reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect does not turn
on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.").
179. Id. at 11-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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based on reasonable suspicion.' l Furthermore, the dissent recognized
the dangers inherent in relying on drug courier proffies to support such
stops."82 Finally, the dissent acknowledged the majority's willingness
"when drug crimes or anti-drug policies are at issue to give short shrift to
constitutional rights," '83 and in so doing in this case, found that the ma-




1. Subjectifying an objective standard
The Court's decision in United States v. Sokolow 85 and the resul-
tant validation of drug courier profiles as a basis for reasonable suspicion
based on a totality of the circumstances is constitutionally problem-
atic."86 By permitting factors described in a profile to provide a basis for
a reasonable suspicion determination,187 the decision allows officers to
determine reasonable suspicion based largely on their subjective interpre-
tation of whether a suspected drug trafficker fits their individual drug
courier profile.'88 However, the constitutional standard for a reasonable
181. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier charac-
teristics runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-case police work, of subjecting
innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment and detention.").
183. Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Whereas, "[i]n requiring that seizures be based on
at least some level of criminal conduct, the Court of Appeals was faithful to the Fourth
Amendment principle that law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect a person of crimi-
nal activity before they can detain him." Id. at 18-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
186. As a preliminary matter, the Court's application of a totality of the circumstances
approach set forth in United States v: Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), may be misplaced. Cortez
was a case that involved transportation of illegal aliens, and so arguably the Court's reliance on
Cortez as justification for a totality of the circumstances analysis in the drug courier context
may be inconsistent with the limitations of Cortez, since prior to the Cortez decision, the gov-
ernment had already defined a compelling interest in protecting the nation's borders, justifying
application of a lesser standard of suspicion in that context. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1988)
(immigration agents may make warrantless searches within reasonable distance from any ex-
ternal boundary of country in order to detect importation of illegal aliens); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints near border for
questioning of occupants permissible even absent suspicion that particular car contains aliens).
187. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
188. See Cloud, supra note 4, at 844. "Judicial approval of [the drug courier profile]
formula permits law enforcers, the very people whose activities are subject to fourth amend-
ment scrutiny, to define the standards by which their conduct is reviewed. It is difficult to
imagine a concept more foreign to traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence, or one more
likely to evoke skepticism from the judiciary." Id.
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suspicion determination is an objective standard:189 whether a reasonable
person, similarly situated, would believe that the suspect was engaged in
criminal activity. 190 This standard is diluted by utilizing drug courier
profiles. As one authority has noted, unlike Terry, under drug courier
profile cases "DEA agents need not advance an objective justification for
their initial stops, because purely subjective and arbitrary drug profile
characteristics provide sufficient justification."'
19 1
The Court's subjectification of the reasonable suspicion standard de-
rives from its departure from the traditional standard for a reasonable
suspicion stop set forth in Terry.192 Rather than requiring that a suspect
be stopped on the basis of specific evidence of "ongoing criminal activ-
ity,"' '  Sokolow allows a suspect to be stopped on the basis of reasonable
suspicion, which can be garnered from factors in a drug courier pro-
file. 94 These factors do not necessarily represent objective indicia of
ongoing criminal activity, but rather describe a class of people that is
predominantly criminal. 195 Thus, the Court endorses an approach to
reasonable suspicion that can be composed entirely of "probabilistic" ele-
ments.196 Rather than focusing on objective facts that indicate that the
189. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968). "The fourth amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be founded upon an
objective justification, governs all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a
brief detention short of traditional arrest." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975).
190. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The Terry Court, in justifying an investigatory stop founded
on the reasonable suspicion standard, reasoned: "Under our decision, courts still retain their
traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or
which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the
Constitution requires." Id. at 15 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980), where, in the drug courier context, the Court stipulated: "The Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be founded upon an objective justifica-
tion, governs all seizures of the person .... ." Id. at 551.
191. Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That Th'Infected
Spy, As All Looks Yellow To The Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C. L. REv. 417, 468 (1987).
192. 392 U.S. 1. Terry requires that justify a stop, a governmental agent "must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. The Court added that "in making that
assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or of the search warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Id. at 21-22.
193. See, e.g., Brown, 443 U.S. at 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
194. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
195. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1
(1989).
196. Probabalistic elements are characteristics that drug couriers may display, but are
equally displayed by the public at large. See Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1420. Thus, when using
such evidence to prosecute a defendant, an officer "testifies not about his own trained observa-
tion of criminal activity, but instead about the probability that drug couriers generally exhibit
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particular suspect may be engaged in crime, the focus is on behavior that
a criminal may be engaged in, 19 7 or on behavior generally indicative of
criminality. This approach is inequitable in that it increases the chance
that an innocent traveler may be subjected to an unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion, and is also directly inconsistent with prior cases in
which the Court has addressed the reasonable suspicion issue.1 98
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sokolow recognized the constitu-
tional hazards of basing reasonable suspicion on a drug courier profile
comprised largely of factors that do not objectively indicate criminal ac-
tivity.1 99 In its decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the DEA did not
certain external characteristics." Id. Such characteristics include: a destination or departure
from a drug source city; manner of dress; time of flight; position among disembarking passen-
gers; method of payment for tickets; and type of luggage. !d; see also infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
197. Sokolow, 392 F.2d at 1418. Profiles do not identify conduct as a basis for reasonable
suspicion that is particular to a crime or suspect, but instead focus on patterns of behavior.
Cloud, supra note 4, at 853 ("The profile's focus is literally not upon an individual's unique
conduct, but upon that conduct's alleged similarity to the behaviors of others.").
198. See, eg., Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Court specifically noted that before a stop is
appropriate, an officer must be able to "point to specific and articulable facts" that warrant the
intrusion. Id. The Court emphasized that "[t]his demand for specificity in the information
upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of [the] Court's Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence." Id. n.18.
A comparison with the facts presented in Terry is appropriate. In Terry, the suspects
were stopped because an officer believed that they were "casing" a jewelry store for a robbery.
Id. at 6. The Court in Terry found that the suspects' behavior was "consistent with the of-
ficer's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daytime robbery," id. at 28, and thus
there were adequate indicia of ongoing criminal activity to support a stop based on the officer's
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 30. However, the stop in Terry was not premised on the fact that
"Terry and his cohort 'looked like' robbers, but instead that their actions betrayed an involve-
ment in a developing crime." Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1419. "The drug-courier profile, if used as
a measure of reasonable suspicion, operates in a different manner than did the officer's trained
evaluation that warranted the stop in Terry." Id.
This inconsistency in application of the reasonable suspicion standard was identified by
the Ninth Circuit in Sokolow when, in reversing Sokolow's conviction, the court stated: "The
[evidence] presented by the government... fails to form an image of ongoing criminal activity
but a class of people that is predominantly criminal. The Supreme Court, by contrast, requires
that the reasonable suspicion supporting an investigative stop be reasonable suspicion of ongo-
ing crime, and thus forecloses the result requested by the government." Id.; see also United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("Based upon [the] whole picture the detaining
officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity."); Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires
that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular individual."); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884
("Except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehi-
cles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from
those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country.").
199. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413.
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have sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Sokolow because, based on
the factors that the agents cited as the justification for their stop, there
was not sufficient indication that Sokolow was engaged in criminal activ-
ity.2" In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that to
justify a stop based on factors found in a drug courier profile, there must
be at least one factor objectively indicating ongoing criminal activity." 1
Only when there is at least one such factor present may "probabilistic
evidence"202 be used.20 3
In Sokolow, the Supreme Court rejected this analysis, finding the
Ninth Circuit's formulaic approach too complicated. 2 4 However, what
the Court offered in place of the Ninth Circuit analysis may sacrifice
Fourth Amendment protection for administrative convenience. In
resorting to a totality of the circumstances approach, rather than sanc-
tioning a more ardent standard for a reasonable suspicion determination,
stops can be based not on an objective indication of ongoing criminal
activity, but on what an officer believes are characteristics a drug courier
should possess.20 5 It is this approach that complicates one of the simple
concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment-the notion that some
level of objective justification is constitutionally mandated before a gov-
ernmental intrusion is permissible.20 6
Furthermore, under the totality of the circumstances approach set
forth in Sokolow, reasonable suspicion may be based on behavioral char-
acteristics that can be equally typical of innocent behavior.20 7 An of-
ficer's expertise and experience in spotting criminal behavior may be
taken into account in determining whether the particular behavior dis-
played is sufficiently suspect to warrant a reasonable suspicion stop.20 8
This approach creates a subterfuge for law enforcement, because in the
context of the Sokolow decision, reasonable suspicion may be based upon
innocent behavioral characteristics that do not necessarily justify this de-
200. Id. at 1424.
201. Id. at 1421-22.
202. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
203. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1423 ("[Criminal] behavior cannot be intuited from a hodge-
podge assembly of 'factors' about individual character rather than criminal acts.").
204. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8.
205. See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
206. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. To deter such egregious police behavior, a suspicion is not
reasonable unless officers have based it on specific and articulable facts "which would warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that criminal activity is afoot." Id.; see also Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
207. Under certain circumstances, "wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot," Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, depending upon "the degree of suspicion
that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts." Id. at 10.
208. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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gree of suspicion, yet are part of a particular officer's drug courier pro-
file.2°9 Thus, by equating behavior that a criminal may engage in with
behavior indicating crime, reasonable suspicion stops may become based
not on evidence of ongoing criminal activity, but on whether the particu-
lar suspect fits a particular officer's subjective interpretation of what a
drug courier should look like. This practice contravenes the limitations
for a totality of the circumstances approach as set forth by the Court in
United States v. Cortez,21 ° and undermines the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, as is evidenced by
prior Supreme Court cases that address the drug courier issue.31
2. Sokolow is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court formulations of
reasonable suspicion in the drug courier context
In Reid v. Georgia,212 the Supreme Court held that there was an
insufficient basis for establishing reasonable suspicion2"3 when the de-
fendant was stopped based on the facts that he arrived from a source
city,2" 4 preceded another person and looked back at him,215 arrived in
the early morning,216 concealed the fact that he and a companion were
traveling together,2 17 and had no luggage other than a shoulder bag.218
The Court in Reid was concerned with the implications of allowing a
"whole picture" analysis to serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion
when the factors individually were typical of innocent behavior.21 9 Thus,
209. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
210. 449 U.S. 441 (1981). In Cortez, the Court stated that in determining whether to stop a
person, a totality of the circumstances must be taken into account. Based upon the "whole
picture," (1) the officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the par-
ticular person stopped of engaging in criminal activity; and (2) there must be a suspicion raised
that the particular person being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Id. at 417-18 (emphasis
added).
211. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in its decision in Sokolow: "The [Supreme] Court has
consistently looked beyond the profile to determine whether a reasonable suspicion exists of a
criminal enterprise. Searches based solely on the personal characteristics of a suspect have
been rejected as unreasonable." Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1421; see, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (only once evidence of ongoing criminal activity was established did other
factors become relevant to support or controvert reasonableness of officers' suspicion); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (rejecting definition of reasonable suspicion not predicated
on ongoing criminal activity-particular conduct of ongoing criminal enterprise required; evi-
dence regarding type of person suspected doesn't suffice).
212. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
213. Id. at 441.





219. Id. at 441 ("[C]ircumstances [that] describe a very large category of presumably inno-
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under Reid, the most general of profile characteristics cannot support a
Terry stop without particularized evidence of suspicious activity.220
The Court in Sokolow acknowledges this requirement.221 The deci-
sion, however, falls short of the standard set forth in Reid. Sokolow was
stopped by DEA agents upon his arrival at Honolulu International Air-
port based on the following information possessed by the agents at the
time of the stop: (1) he paid $2100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of
$20 bills; 222 (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name
under which his telephone was listed;223 '(3) his original destination was
Miami, a source city for drugs; 224 (4) he stayed in Miami for only forty-
eight hours;22 (5) he appeared nervous during his trip;226 and (6) he
checked none of his luggage.227 Of these characteristics, the facts that
Sokolow checked none of his luggage and was flying to Miami, a source
city for drugs, are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion under the
Court's decision in Reid.228 The fact that Sokolow appeared nervous
while traveling should not, in itself, be conclusive as to any level of crimi-
nality, because it is common knowledge that air travelers are often ner-
vous.229 That Sokolow's phone was not listed in his name should also
not be conclusively indicative of criminality. It was later revealed that
the phone number that Sokolow gave was listed to his roommate.230
Thus, the only facts that the Court in Sokolow should have relied
upon, based on Reid, are that Sokolow paid $2100 in cash from a roll of
$20 bills, and that he stayed in Miami for only forty-eight hours, even
though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes twenty hours.
However, the fact that Sokolow paid for his ticket with a large sum of
cash is not indicative of ongoing criminal activity. As the dissent in
Sokolow recognized, possessing large amounts of cash would be evidence
of past and not necessarily present criminal activity,231 or even an aver-
sion to or an inability to pay by any other means, 232 and thus should not
cent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude
that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.").
220. United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1511 (9th Cir. 1986).
221. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.






228. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
229. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1423.
230. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 4.
231. Id. at 16-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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be the basis for reasonable suspicion in this case. The sole factor left to
justify the stop is the unusually short turnaround time for Sokolow's
flight, which may be suspicious, but certainly is not sufficient in itself to
find reasonable suspicion.
It is difficult to rationalize how the factors set forth in Sokolow are
more suggestive of criminality than those in Reid.233 Yet in Sokolow,
unlike Reid, the Court found it permissible to base reasonable suspicion
on facts that, standing alone, do not seem indicative of ongoing criminal
activity.234 For this reason, after Sokolow, adopting a totality of the cir-
cumstances approach makes justifying a reasonable suspicion intrusion
more simple because the factors standing alone do not need to be indica-
tive of criminal behavior, but can be equally characteristic of innocent
conduct.
2 35
3. Sokolow diminishes constitutional guarantees of all citizens
By resorting to a totality of the circumstances approach, Sokolow
not only diminishes the constitutional guarantees of potential defendants,
but of equal significance, "diminishes the rights of all citizens to be se-
cure in their persons' ... as they traverse the Nation's airports" 23 6 -a
result that is constitutionally impermissible.
237
The DEA does not keep statistical data of the percentage of people
stopped pursuant to drug courier proffles who do have drugs, 2 38 yet some
statistics have been developed. The percentage of those stopped is suffi-
233. Id. at 15 (Marshall, ., dissenting) ("The facts known to the DEA agents at the time
they detained the traveler in this case are scarcely more suggestive of ongoing criminal activity
than those in Reid.").
234. The bases for the agents' stop in Sokolow was that Sokolow paid for tickets with cash,
traveled to Miami for a short trip with only carry-on luggage, and appeared nervous. Id. at 3.
The Court included the fact that Sokolow traveled using a name that did not match the name
under which his phone number was listed as a factor that the agents used to establish reason-
able suspicion to support their stop. Id. It was later revealed, however, that the name under
which Sokolow's phone was listed was that of his roommate. Id. at 4. The agents were una-
ware of this at the time of their stop. Id.
235. As the Court acknowledged in approving the agents' conduct in Sokolow, "[a]ny of
these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent
travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion." Id. at 9.
236. Id. at 11-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)
(what person seeks to preserve as private, even in area accessible to public, may be constitu-
tionally protected; bypassing constitutional check of warrant procedure leaves citizens vulnera-
ble to Fourth Amendment violations).
238. Francis K. Toto, Note, Drug Courier Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment: Is the
Supreme Court's Case of Confusion In Its Terminal Stage?, 15 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 217, 221
(1981).
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ciently below those who actually carry drugs239 to indicate that there is
significant infringement on the rights of innocent travelers in the nation's
airports, 2 ° particularly if viewed in light of the fact that the statistics
may include stops based on less than a constitutionally mandated degree
of suspicion.241
The purpose of the reasonable suspicion standard as a prerequisite
to such seizures is to protect innocent persons from being subjected to
"overbearing or harassing" police conduct, carried out solely on the basis
of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals should look like or solely on
the basis of characteristics such as race.242 Such bases for stops have
been strictly abrogated previously by the Court.243 But after Sokolow, a
drug courier profile serving to support a stop can be based on a totality of
the circumstances in light of an officer's experience,2 which inevitably
will include elements that an officer believes characterize drug couriers.
This may be a dangerous constitutional infringement to all citizens, as
the result may be an increase in stops based on stereotypes245 and preju-
dice, particularly racial prejudice. 246
239. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
240. See, eg., United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., dissent-
ing) (DEA agents testified at trial that in 1989 they had detained 600 suspects and of those
stops only 10 resulted in arrests); United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (7th Cir.)
(Sygert, J., concurring) (government admitted that at O'Hare Airport 6 to 12 stops a day were
made and only 30% of encounters involved searches which resulted in seizure of narcotics;
court noted "many innocent people were being stopped and questioned"), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1209 (1983); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979) (agent reported
that 60% of people stopped had drugs); United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 539
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (during first 18 months of drug courier program, agents watching Detroit
Airport searched 142 persons in 96 encounters; controlled substances were found in 77 of these
encounters), aff'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
241. As the dissent in Mendenhall indicated:
Mr. Justice Powell's conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting
Ms. Mendenhall of criminal activity relies heavily on the assertion that the DEA
agents "acted pursuant to a well-planned, and effective, federal law enforcement pro-
gram." Yet there is no indication that the asserted successes of the "drug courier
program" have been obtained by reliance on the kind of nearly random stop involved
in this case.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 573 n.ll (White, J., dissenting).
242. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1,
14-15 & n.ll (1968)).
243. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886.
244. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10.
245. Note the repeated reference to what Sokolow was wearing (black jump suit and gold
chains) in the Sokolow opinion. Id. at 4-5. This reference to "stereotypical drug dealer attire"
had no place in the majority's analysis. "That Sokolow was dressed in a black jumpsuit and
wore gold jewelry provides no grounds for suspecting wrongdoing." Id. at 16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
246. "Although the DEA has refused to commit the entire [drug courier] profile to writing,
the profile clearly contains a racial component." Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to
DRUG COURIER PROFILES
4. Problems of administration and application
The discrepancy in application of drug courier profiles indicates that
their application as a basis for reasonable suspicion has been difficult for
courts. Courts must determine "whether in each particular case the
combination of facts present and the manner in which they are exhibited
justifies a stop."24 7 This problem of interpretation may be greatly advan-
tageous for law enforcement, as it renders all drug courier profile stops
"experimental." That is, an agent will not know if he or she has enough
suspicion to justify a stop until a case goes to court-after the possibly
invalid encounter has already occurred. In addition, even if it is ulti-
mately found that the agent lacked reasonable suspicion when making
the stop, the evidence derived from the stop will in some instances still be
admitted.24
The fact that courts have little guidance is additionally problematic.
With unclear guidelines courts cannot effectively serve as administrators
of the drug courier profile system. By basing reasonable suspicion on a
totality of the circumstances that can be derived from a drug courier
profile,249 but by failing to articulate what types of factors should com-
prise a workable drug courier profile, the Court in Sokolow reinforces the
profile as a subjective tool for law enforcement. Rather than establishing
a framework for the profile's application, the Court defers administration
to the DEA and its agents.25° Thus, the creation and implementation of
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 234 (1983); see, e.g., Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d
465 (8th Cir. 1990) (court invalidated seizure in which suspect was stopped largely because he
was black), petition for reh'gfiled (U.S. May 16, 1991) (No. 90-17638); United States v. Taylor,
917 F.2d 1402, 1408-09 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendant was only black person who had deplaned;
officer admitted that there was no true drug courier profile, and that he had stopped defendant
because he looked "different" from other travelers; court concluded "agents more apt to stop
[a defendant] because of race"), vacated, reh'g granted, 925 F.2d 990 (1991); Mark Curriden,
Drug Profile Hit, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 25 (black former baseball star Joe Morgan prevailed
in suit against Los Angeles Police Department after being wrongfully detained as suspected
drug courier and beaten to ground).
247. United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1228 (6th Cir. 1983).
248. See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77
(1990), in which the court found that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the de-
fendant and to detain his luggage to procure a search warrant, however, the court admitted the
evidence of contraband because the officers acted in "good faith." Id. at 1419. The good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, defined by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), provides that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, even
if in fact obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is not subject to the exclusionary
rule if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed the seizure valid. Id. at 918.
249. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10. Referring to the factors used to establish reasonable suspicion
in Sokolow's case, the Court stipulated that "the fact that these factors may be set forth in a
[drug courier] 'profile' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance." Id.
250. Indeed, as one commentator has noted:
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drug courier proffles-a profile that the Court sanctions as being a valid
basis for a stop with a lesser degree of protection than previously has
been mandated251 -is in the hands of those whom the Fourth Amend-
ment is designed to check.25 2 With so little guidance, courts will have
difficulty monitoring the profile effectively.253
This notion is illustrated by the inconsistent application of Sokolow
by the lower courts. The Court's decision in Sokolow leaves lower courts
only with the vague facts set forth in Sokolow as guidance, and these
factors may be constitutionally deficient to justify a reasonable suspicion
stop in many instances.25 4 The practical effect of the Court's decision in
The most remarkable attribute of the judicial response to the drug courier profile has
been the willingness of the courts to accept government claims that a traveler's con-
duct conformed to the profile in the absence of any specific definition of the charac-
teristics comprising it. Defining the profile is a prerequisite to interpreting its impact
on constitutional decisionmaking. For if there are characteristic behaviors which
justify intrusions upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment because they
are common to drug couriers, the government must be able to identify these charac-
teristics in order to rely upon them.
Cloud, supra note 4, at 869.
251. See supra notes 14-21.
252. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text. "[T]he protections intended by the
Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of multifarious cir-
cumstances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the
first instance by police officers engaged in the 'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.'" Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
253. Becton, supra note 191, at 472.
254. See, e.g., Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1409 (no reasonable suspicion found to support stop of
black suspect who arrived on flight from Miami, dressed in casual manner, and hurried
through terminal clutching his luggage); United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir.
1990) (insufficient bases to support reasonable suspicion stop when agent, at time he stopped
suspect, knew that he had arrived on early morning flight, was one of first passengers to
deplane, carried garment bag and checked no luggage, walked rapidly through airport without
distraction, purchased one-way ticket with cash day before flight, and had bulge in his coat);
fhite, 890 F.2d at 1417 (court compared characteristics displayed by suspect to those in
Reid, and found no basis for reasonable suspicion stop of suspect or his luggage when suspect
deplaned from source-city, arrived in early morning, purchased one-way ticket with cash, held
carry-on bag closely with both hands, appeared nervous as he walked through airport, but
seizure subsequently upheld based on good faith exception). But see United States v. Rose, 889
F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989) (reasonable suspicion found to support stop when suspect
arrived from source-city carrying only duffel bag, walked rapidly and nervously through termi-
nal, stopped to make several hurried phone calls, and then rapidly departed airline terminal
and proceeded to car parked in short-term parking lot); United States v. Malone, 886 F.2d
1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1989) (DEA agents had reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug courier
activity which warranted brief detention of defendant and his bag when suspect was young,
black male wearing gang colors, traveled on airline favored by gang members transporting
drugs, glanced around airport furtively, had no identification, gave agent "hard" look, and
carried only one bag for three-day stay); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir.
1989) (state trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion at time he stopped defendant
even though passenger neither traveled under alias, nor used evasive route through airport, but
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Sokolow is to make it possible for an agent to stop a suspect based on
little more than his or her gut instinct that a suspect may be trafficking
drugs.255
5. "Chameleon-like quality"
Absent a judicial standard, the inherent malleability of drug courier
profiles is troubling. Drug courier proffles are not written down and they
are ever-changing.256 "Some commentators and courts have even sug-
gested that profiles completely change from one occurrence to another,
allowing an agent to stop almost anyone. ' 25 7 The approach taken in
Sokolow falls short of constitutional protection because it allows reason-
able suspicion to be based on a set of factors which often have "a chame-
leon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.)
258
"Rather than use the profile as a reliable guideline, agents may selectively
made short trip to known source city, walked quickly through airport, seemed to be evading
security, and repeatedly glanced at window which reflected interior of concourse), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 847 (1990).
255. This is especially supported by the fact that an officer's experience is a component of
the decision to stop a suspect. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. However, the DEA has trained
narcotics officers to identify drug smugglers on the basis of circumstantial evidence seen in a
drug courier profile. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 n.6. Thus, any check that there may be to guard
against stops based on an officer's subjective interpretation of what a drug courier should look
like is removed. See, eg., Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1497 (Martin, J., concurring) (United States
declared that defendant must have satisfied drug courier profile, because when searched, he
had drugs).
256. See Becton, supra note 191, at 418, 438. "The characteristics to which officers, and
some courts, attach significance in defense of narcotics-related airport stops are disconcertingly
interchangeable." White, 890 F.2d at 1418.
257. See Becton, supra note 191, at 433-38. One agent candidly admitted that the profile in
a particular case consists of anything that arouses suspicion. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F.
Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
258. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1418. Compare Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 564 (suspect last to
deplane) with United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980) (deplaned
from middle) and United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982) (among first to
deplane), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983); United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th
Cir. 1990) (one-way ticket) with United States v. Jaramillo, 891 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1989)
(open return date), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1791 (1990) and United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d
594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (round-trip ticket); Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1415 (paid for tickets with
cash from roll of $20 bills) with Reid, 448 U.S. at 439 (paid for tickets with credit card);
Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1418 (changed planes) with United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720
(6th Cir. 1977) (non-stop flight); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 (no luggage) with Reid, 448 U.S.
at 441 (shoulder bag) and Buffkins, 922 F.2d at 467 (luggage and teddy bear) and Royer, 460
U.S at 494 n.2 (American Tourister luggage which looked heavy) and White, 890 F.2d at 1414
(holding small carry-on bag tucked under arm with both hands instead of using shoulder
strap) and United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 1979) (one carry-on and two
checked pieces of luggage); Reid, 448 U.S. at 441 (traveling together but attempting to appear
separate) with United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1980) (traveling with com-
panion) and United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978) (traveling alone).
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modify the proffle during the initial stop and thereafter customize it to fit
any hapless traveler who had the misfortune to catch the agent's 'trained
eye.' '259
6. Promotes retroactive validation and "voluntary" encounters
Adopting a totality of the circumstances approach based on drug
courier profiles creates the dangerous possibility of retroactive validation
of a stop of a suspected drug courier.210 That is, by sanctioning drug
courier profiles to support reasonable suspicion, but by failing to define
components of drug courier proffiles, the Court leaves open the possibility
that an officer may stop a suspect based on a hunch, 61 and then later
justify the stop by saying that the officer had reasonable suspicion that
the suspect, under a totality of the circumstances, fit the particular of-
ficer's drug courier profile.26 The profile, in this case, could change to
match the particular suspect's characteristics after the stop.2 63 This pos-
sibility is increasingly difficult to overcome in a Fourth Amendment ar-
gument, because added to the danger of retroactive validation is the
argument that the initial encounter between the officer and the suspect
was voluntary, and thus not invoking Fourth Amendment protection.
264
259. Becton, supra note 191, at 438.
260. See Cloud, supra note 4, at 858 ("Proof that the profile characteristics relied upon
were defined in advance of a seizure is an essential first step for effective judicial review. Other-
wise the profile can be adjusted to apply to the facts of individual cases after the seizure has
occurred.").
261. This is a practice clearly proscribed by Fourth Amendment constitutional guarantees.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
262. The danger is that officers may label characteristics "drug courier profiles" just to
justify a stop. The "use of the words 'drug courier profile'. . . adds nothing to the factors
observed; those factors must rise to the level of reasonable suspicion or fall to the level of a
mere hunch on their own." United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 698
(E.D.N.Y. 1977). Indeed, when questioned by the court about his stop of Sokolow, Agent
Kempshall testified that he "had all the classic aspects of a drug courier." Sokolow, 490 U.S.
at 10 n.6.
263. See Becton, supra note 191, at 438 ("Multiplicity of inconsistent [profile] characteris-
tics strongly suggests that agents justify the great majority of airport drug courier stops
retrospectively.").
264. Not all police-citizen encounters invoke Fourth Amendment protection. "[Police of-
ficers enjoy] the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons
for ordinarily, the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his [or her] interrogator and
walk away." Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring). "Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may [it be deemed] that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The Court
adopted this approach in Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551. The standard adopted by the Court in
determining whether an encounter was voluntary, and thereby not invoking Fourth Amend-
ment protection, is whether a reasonable.person similarly situated would have believed that
they were free to leave. Id. at 552-53. In Mendenhall, the Court concluded that "[a]s long as
the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,
[Vol. 25:321
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As law enforcement officers may initially deem an encounter to be volun-
tary, information that they gather during this "voluntary" encounter
may become the basis for their reasonable suspicion later. 65
E. Balancing Test
To justify an intrusion based on less than probable cause, there must
be a balancing between the relative intrusiveness to a citizen, and a legiti-
mate governmental objective.2 66 Thus, to determine the constitutionality
of such stops, it is necessary to consider whether the relative intrusive-
ness of the governmental action is outweighed by a compelling govern-
mental interest in combatting drug trafficking. In certain instances, the
United States Supreme Court has employed a "balancing test" to justify
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitu-
tion require some particularized and objective justification." Id. at 554.
265. See D'Ambrosio, supra note 4, at 282. The "free to leave" standard of Mendenhall
has been criticized as "artificial" and as based on the false assumption that ordinary citizens
believe that they are normally free to cut police inquiries short. Edmund J. Butterfoss, Bright
Line Seizures The Need For Clarity In Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins,
79 J. CiuM. L. & CRiMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988). Indeed, the Court has noted that "[d]rug
interdiction efforts have led to the use of police surveillance at airports, train stations and bus
depots. Law enforcement officers stationed at such locations routinely approach individuals,
either randomly or because they suspect in some vague way that the individuals may be en-
gaged in criminal activity, and ask them potentially incriminating questions." Florida v. Bos-
tick, 111 S. CE. 2382, 2384 (1991). This is precipitated by problems associated with defining
limitations of voluntary police encounters.
In general, not all police encounters invoke Fourth Amendment protection. Terry, 392
U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring). Rather, police are free to approach a suspected trav-
eler, provided that a reasonable person would understand that they were free to leave. Califor-
nia v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). This "free to leave" standard is nebulous at
best. The Court has previously ruled that a suspect does not have to be informed that he or
she is free to leave for an encounter to be deemed voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). Furthermore, in the past year alone the Court has held that a person
is not seized-free to leave for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment-until actually tackled
to the ground when being pursued by police. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1559. Further, passen-
gers on a bus are not seized when approached by officers, even though physically restrained
from leaving the bus. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387. As the Court noted, "when the person is
seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel
that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter
... [T]he mere fact that [a suspect] did not feel free to leave the bus does not mean that the
police seized him." Id. This notion is particularly threatening in light of the Court's acknowl-
edgement that "[tihe community has a rel interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting
search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime." Florida v.
Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (1991).
266. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967). The permissibility of a
particular practice "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
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stops based on less than probable cause,2 67 or, in limited instances, has
required no level of suspicion whatsoever.268 However, "[a] central con-
cern in balancing these competing considerations in a variety of settings
has been to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of
officers in the field."
'2 6 9
The Court in United States v. Sokolow,270 in effect, has justified stops
on less than the degree of suspicion that the Court has mandated in pre-
vious decisions addressing reasonable suspicion stops, 271 yet has em-
ployed no balancing test to justify this practice. Furthermore, in
previous situations in which the Court has applied a balancing test ap-
proach, the Court has emphasized a lack of discrimination in who will be
subject to the intrusion,272 a lack of discretion in administration,273 and
has demonstrated the impracticability of utilizing less intrusive means.274
The Court in Sokolow has not identified any of these considerations in its
analysis. This practice represents intellectual dishonesty in a blatant
form. 275
F. The Implications of United States v. Sokolow
Although there is a compelling need in this country to curtail illicit
drug use,2 76 "the 'War on Drugs' can never license law enforcement offi-
267. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
268. See, e.g., id. (mandatory drug testing of certain customs workers permissible in light of
governmental interest in safety, limited discretion in administering test, and relatively minor
nature of intrusion).
269. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
270. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
271. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967); see also supra notes 192-94 and accompany-
ing text.
272. See, e.g., Van Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (every employee applying for transfer to covered
position must take drug test and is made aware of this requirement).
273. See, e.g., Brown, 443 U.S. at 49. "[IThe Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require
the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a
plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Id.; see also
Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967), noting absence of "discretion of the official in the field."
274. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
275. Justice Brennan characterized this practice in his dissenting opinion in Michigan v.
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488-89 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The majority opinion creates the impression that the Court generally engages in a
balancing test in order to determine the constitutionality of all seizures.... This is
not the case. In most cases, the police must possess probable cause for a seizure to be
judged reasonable... only when a seizure is substantially less intrusive... than a
typical arrest is the general rule replaced by a balancing test.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
276. Indeed, the Court has identified the "veritable national crisis in law enforcement
DRUG COURIER PROFILES
cials to disregard the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of our
Constitution."277 The Fourth Amendment embodies dual concerns of
protecting privacy and avoiding arbitrariness and abuse.278 "The obvi-
ous necessity for police interdiction of drug couriers and traffickers does
not outweigh the constitutional standards for police intrusions into the
affairs of ordinary citizens." '279 This is so even if an airport encounter is
deemed to be relatively nonintrusive. 80 Precisely because the need for
action against illegal drug trafficking is so compelling, the need for vigi-
lance in protection of constitutional interests becomes great.28'
The reasonable suspicion standard is a standard implemented to al-
low for governmental action based on less than probable cause when
there is a compelling government interest.282 Nevertheless, the decision
in United States v. Sokolow283 and its subsequent application dangerously
jeopardizes the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment by making it possi-
ble for government agents to sidestep the safeguards meant to be pro-
vided by the reasonable suspicion standard. These constitutional
safeguards are necessary to guard the rights of all citizens. "[S]imple
good faith on the part of [an] officer.., is not enough. If subjective good
faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be secure only in the discretion of
the police." '284 The use of drug courier profiles as sanctioned in Sokolow
allows for stops based on less than the minimum mandated by the Fourth
Amendment, and increases the possibility of police harassment of inno-
cent travelers. This result is constitutionally suspect. "That the [Fourth]
[A]mendment may, at times, protect the criminal is the price that must
caused by the smuggling of illicit narcotics" as "one of the greatest problems affecting the
health and welfare of our population." National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 668 (1989).
277. United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1412 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated, rehg granted,
925 F.2d 990 (1991).
278. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
279. United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1497 (6th Cir. 1989) (Martin, J., concurring).
280. "Countenancing large numbers of minor, though unwarranted, intrusions erodes the
principle of freedom from official interference guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, and
invites the use of arbitrary or discriminatory principles of selection abhorrent to the Fourth
Amendment." United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983) (Swygert, J.,
concurring), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984).
281. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989). As Justice
Marshall notes in his dissent: "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure .... When we
allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we
invariably come to regret it." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
282. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1968).
283. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
284. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
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be paid if we are to keep these protections alive for all people. '285
The decision in Sokolow is particularly foreboding in light of subse-
quent decisions by the Court. After Sokolow, the Court has recognized:
(1) that information to support a reasonable suspicion stop can be less
reliable than that required to support a stop based on probable cause;286
(2) law enforcement officers may, with no degree of suspicion whatso-
ever, approach passengers on buses and request to search their luggage,
despite the fact that the bus passengers may not physically be free to
leave;287 and (3) a stop will be deemed to be a voluntary encounter up
until the point that a suspect is tackled to the ground.288 As the dissent
aptly points out in Florida v. Bostick ,289 "[i]n this 'anything goes' war on
drugs, random kniocks on the doors of our citizens' homes seeking 'con-
sent' to search for drugs cannot be far away. This is not America. )290
III. RECOMMENDATION: ABROGATE THE USE OF DRUG COURIER
PROFILES
By adopting a totality of the circumstances approach in United
States v. Sokolow,291 the United States Supreme Court subjects innocent
travelers of the nation's airports to unconstitutional harassment by drug
enforcement agents, and allows these agents to stop suspects based on
reasonable suspicion garnered from characteristics that can be com-
pletely benign.292 The approach validated by the Court is neither a mi-
nor intrusion, nor is it an effective means of halting drug trafficking.
There is a need to analyze not just the relative gravity of the intrusion
285. Cordell, 723 F.2d at 1288.
286. Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in
the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is differ-
ent in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable
than that required to show probable cause.
Id. at 2416.
287. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). The Court in Bostick posited that these
encounters would still be voluntary; see supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text. The Court
also specifically indicated that the rule set forth in the case applies equally "to encounters that
take place on a city street or in an airport lobby." Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389.
288. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991). The Court reasoned that the
suspect was free to leave up until the point that he was actually knocked to the ground. Id. at
1551-52. "The word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application
of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful." Id. at 1550.
289. 111 S. Ct. 2382.
290. Id. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
291. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
292. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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against a potential defendant, but also against the public at large,29 3 espe-
cially when viewed in relation to subsequent decisions by the Court.
To protect the Fourth Amendment interests of all citizens, the
Court should do away with drug courier profiles as a basis of reasonable
suspicion to support airport stops of suspected drug traffickers. Drug
courier profiles have been characterized as "prejudicial because of the
potential they have for including innocent citizens as profiled drug couri-
ers," 294 have been rejected by some courts as evidence at trial because of
their inherent unreliability,295 and have come to serve as an artificial
means for agents to justify intrusions based on reasonable suspicion.2 9 6
Furthermore, drug courier profiles have questionable legitimate effi-
cacy.29 7 Drug courier profiles are not necessary; protection of the na-
tion's airports can be achieved just as effectively through other means.
There are two compelling alternatives.
First, rather than basing reasonable suspicion on an amorphous and
malleable set of characteristics, which has proven to be problematic for
several of the reasons outlined above, the Court should go back to a
traditional Terry-type analysis for airport stops. That is, rather than re-
lying on a "drug courier profile" to stop a suspect, an officer must have
reasonable, articulable facts supporting a finding that "criminal activity
may be afoot. ' 298 This analysis would protect the Fourth Amendment
interests of both innocent travelers, and potential defendants, by prevent-
ing stops from being based on less than reasonable suspicion, and by
preventing arrests from being retroactively justified based on facts con-
structed after a suspect has been stopped on less than reasonable
suspicion.
This approach would ensure more fairness to those invoking Fourth
Amendment protection, and would simultaneously ease enforcement and
293. See United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1425 (9th Cir. 1987) (Wiggins, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
294. United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983).
295. See, eg., United States v. Lui, No. 89-50557, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17413, at *5 (9th
Cir. Aug. 5, 1991), in which the court noted:
Drug courier profiles are inherently prejudicial because of the potential they have for
including innocent citizens as profiled drug couriers .... Every defendant has a right
to be tried based on the evidence against him or her, not on the techniques utilized by
law enforcement officials in investigating criminal activity. Drug courier profile evi-
dence is nothing more than the opinion of those officers conducting an investigation.
Id.
296. See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
297. "Even if such proffles had reliable predictive value, their utility would be short-lived,
for drug couriers will adapt their behavior to sidestep detection from profile-focused officers.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 14 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
298. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
November 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:321
administration because it would not be necessary for courts to continu-
ally evaluate the ever-changing drug courier profiles on a case-by-case
basis.29 9 The Court should adopt guidelines similar to those advised by
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sokolow,3°° such that before "drug
courier" stops are upheld as being validly based on reasonable suspicion,
an officer must satisfy a threshold determination of whether there existed
specific, articulable facts sufficient to objectively justify a stop.301
An alternative recommendation that would achieve the desired ef-
fect of thwarting drug trafficking, would support ease of administration,
and that is more constitutionally sound, is to subject all travelers at air-
ports to a "search" in a truly de minimis fashion, for example, by having
all luggage sniffed for drugs by drug-detecting dogs. This is consistent
with the "searches" that all airline travelers must currently undergo for
weapons before boarding aircraft. 3 2 A traveler who feels that such a
299. This is especially true since judges do not have access to profiles, but must rely on what
officers report the profile characteristics to be. See D'Ambrosio, supra note 4, at 294.
300. 831 F.2d 1413.
301. Id. at 1428. The necessity of a return to this approach has also been recognized by the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1229 n.I 1 (6th Cir. 1983):
A return to Terry v. Ohio is the clearest way to resolve the Fourth Amendment
issues raised in the [drug courier] context.... In light of the Supreme Court's refusal
to issue a clear statement on the use of the profile and the facially inconsistent results
reached in the case by case treatment of the issue, both in the Supreme Court and in
most lower courts, a return to the majority statement in Terry is only logical. The
inquiry necessarily narrows to the bounds of Terry; whether there are reasonable,
articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts which would justify any stop
and, if so, whether the intrusion is sufficiently limited to remain justifiable absent
probable cause. It is only in terms of this basic Fourth Amendment analysis that the
drug courier profile can be properly addressed.
Id. When Saperstein was decided in 1983, the only non-plurality decision by the United States
Supreme Court that addressed the reasonable suspicion standard in the context of drug courier
profiles was Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), and Reid was a per curiam decision. Saper-
stein, 723 F.2d at 1229 n. 11. Although both Mendenhall and Sokolow have been decided
subsequent to Saperstein, in light of the absence of guidelines provided by the United States
Supreme Court in the drug courier context, the reasoning on this point in Saperstein remains
sound.
302. This approach is also consistent with the position that the Supreme Court has taken in
the area of random stops of automobiles in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In
Prouse, the Court deemed that purely random stops of automobiles were not constitutionally
permissible, but suggested alternatives that could be acceptable, such as stopping every tenth
car, id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring), or stopping all oncoming traffic at road-block type
stops, id. at 657 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court reasoned that this type of stop is less
intrusive than a random stop because it would not involve an unconstrained exercise of discre-
tion, and at traffic checkpoint stops a person can see that there are others being stopped, and
there are visible signs of officers' authority, such that a person stopped is much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). The approach sug-
gested in Prouse has recently been adopted by the Court in Michigan Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), in which the Court deemed that stopping all cars at sobriety
checkpoints is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 2488.
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search is unduly intrusive could find alternative means of transportation.
Since trafficking drugs by means other than air-travel may be impracti-
cal, if not impossible, at least some drug trafficking would be thwarted.
In addition, the randomness and concomitant constitutional violations,
which the use of drug courier stops seems to advance, would be abated.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Sokolow,3 °3 which supports the notion that reasonable suspicion based on
a totality of the circumstances can be founded on factors loosely defined
as a "drug courier profile," is inherently unreasonable. The decision pro-
motes the application of profiles to justify stops based on subjective fac-
tors-factors that can be equally indicative of innocent behavior. This
result is inconsistent with the Court's established standard of objective
indicia of ongoing criminal activity to support stops based on reasonable
suspicion.3°4 Society's interest in deterring drug smuggling does not out-
weigh the guarantees of constitutional protection to all citizens against
overbearing and harassing police conduct when there are less arbitrary
means of enforcing anti-smuggling programs.
Rather than allowing airport stops to be based on drug courier
profiles, the Court should abrogate the use of such profiles and mandate
that airport stops be governed, as stops in other circumstances, by a
traditional reasonable suspicion analysis. In the alternative, the Court
should require that all airport travelers be subject to identical scrutiny
when traveling through the nation's airports-a result that is consistent
with airport security in other contexts, and a result that would eliminate
random governmental intrusions based on factors that fail to satisfy the
guarantees of the Constitution.
Jodi Sax
303. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
304. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
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